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BACKGROUND: In obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), actions persist despite being inappropriate to the situation
and without relationship to the overall goal. Dysfunctional beliefs have traditionally been postulated to underlie this
condition. More recently, OCD has been characterized in terms of an imbalance between the goal-directed and
the habit systems. To test these competing hypotheses, we used a novel experimental task designed to test
subjective action-outcome knowledge of the effectiveness of actions (i.e., instrumental contingency), together with
the balance between goal-directed and habitual responding.
METHODS: Twenty-seven patients with OCD and 27 healthy control subjects were tested on a novel task involving
the degradation of an action-outcome contingency. Sensitivity to instrumental contingency and the extent to which
explicitly reported action-outcome knowledge guided behavior were probed by measuring response rate and
subjectively reported judgments.
RESULTS: Patients with OCD responded more than healthy control subjects in situations in which an action was less
causally related to obtaining an outcome. However, patients showed intact explicit action-outcome knowledge, as
assessed by self-report. In patients, the relationship between causality judgment and responding was altered;
therefore, their actions were dissociated from explicit action-outcome knowledge.
CONCLUSIONS: These ﬁndings indicate reduced sensitivity to instrumental contingency in OCD, reinforcing the
notion of a deﬁcient goal-directed system in this disorder. By showing a dissociation between subjectively reported
action-outcome knowledge and behavior, the data provide experimental evidence for the ego-dystonic nature of
OCD.
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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bpsc.2018.09.014Action is controlled by different learning mechanisms. Actions
followed by a reinforcer are more likely to be repeated in the
future in a habitual manner as a consequence of strengthening
stimulus-response (S-R) representations. However, animals do
not merely repeat previously reinforced actions but can instead
make deliberate, goal-directed choices based on their knowl-
edge of the relationship between an action and the associated
outcome and their motivation to obtain that outcome (1). As
such, adaptive everyday behavior is regulated by the balance
between the goal-directed and the habitual systems. A dis-
rupted balance between these two systems has been hy-
pothesized to be relevant for understanding compulsive
behaviors (2). These manifest as actions persistently repeated
without relationship to the overall goal (3) where the habitual
system seemingly overtakes response control (2).
Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is the prototypical
disorder of compulsivity, and it manifests as a lack of goal-
directed control over repetitive, ritualistic actions and intru-
sive thoughts. Compulsions are also characterized by theCrown Copyright ª 2018 Published by Elsevier Inc on behalf of So
CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
ical Psychiatry: Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuroimaging Februaryfeeling of being compelled or forced to engage in such be-
haviors (4), and they are generally associated with the insight
that such actions are ultimately harmful and purposeless.
Therefore, OCD is ego-dystonic, as patients recognize their
compulsive behaviors and thoughts as disproportionate,
excessive, and maladaptive (5). Often, it is this disconnection
between the responses patients ﬁnd themselves making, as
opposed to the responses they know to be rational, that
causes so much distress (6).
Traditionally, cognitive theories posited dysfunctional be-
liefs as a major driver of OCD (7,8). However, recent experi-
mental evidence (9–11) has suggested that OCD is a disorder
of habitual control, as irrelevant behavior is maintained in the
face of changes in the value of the outcome previously
associated with the action (9–11) and in the face of intact
conﬁdence updating (12). According to learning theory, goal-
directed agents are also sensitive to the causal relationship
(i.e., instrumental contingency) between the response and the
reward: if instrumental responding continues when suchciety of Biological Psychiatry. This is an open access article under the
2019; 4:200–209 www.sobp.org/BPCNNI ISSN: 2451-9022
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habitual (S-R) control (1). Contingency-based instrumental
responding has been tested across species and found to be
mediated by frontostriatal neural circuitry (13–22) implicated in
OCD (23) and other disorders of compulsivity [i.e., drug
addiction (24) and binge-eating disorder (25)]. As the causal
action-outcome association is weakened, a reduction in
behavioral responding is usually observed, and, in humans,
lower estimates of causal inﬂuence on outcome occurrence
are reported via explicit causal judgments.
In this study, we capitalized on contingency degradation
(1,17) to test the robustness of action-outcome causal asso-
ciations in OCD. With this experimental manipulation, we
measured not only behavioral adjustment following changes in
instrumental contingency but also how individuals subjectively
perceived that causal relationship. Therefore, we were able to
test whether patients with OCD, as compared with control
subjects, 1) showed goal-directed control by modulating their
behavior in response to changes in the causal action-outcome
relationship; 2) accurately reported knowledge of the action-
outcome causal relationship; and, crucially, 3) differentially
used action-outcome knowledge to guide their behavior.
Therefore, our experimental manipulation enabled testing the
following two competing hypotheses of a correspondence
versus a dissociation between perceived contingencies and
behavior. On the one hand, compulsive behaviors (e.g.,
checking or rituals to prevent harm) may be interpreted as
attempts to establish control. In this respect, compulsions
might result from an increased sense of responsibility (7) or, in
contrast, as superstitious behaviors carried out either to regain
a subjective sense of control or because contingencies are
misperceived (26–28). Accordingly, a correspondence be-
tween inﬂated (or deﬂated) perceived contingencies and
behavior would argue for cognitive accounts for OCD, whereby
compulsions are guided by erroneous cognitive interpretation
of environmental cues. On the other hand, patients with OCD
generally recognize their behavior as irrational and hence
exhibit a dichotomy between their behavior and their beliefsTable 1. Demographics and Clinical Characteristics of Studied
CTL Group (n = 27) O
Demographic Characteristics
Gender, male/female 13/14
Age, years 40.67 6 11.29
Estimated verbal IQa 117.99 6 3.66
Clinical Characteristics
MADRS 1.11 6 1.98
STAI-Stateb 28.15 6 6.08
STAI-Traitb 33.85 6 6.82
OCI-Rb 6.37 6 5.34
Y-BOCS total —
Y-BOCS obsessions —
Y-BOCS compulsions —
Values are mean 6 SD or n.
CTL, control; MADRS, Montgomery–Åsberg Depression Rating Scale;
Inventory–Revised; STAI, State–Trait Anxiety Inventory; Y-BOCS, Yale-Brow
aEstimated verbal IQ was measured with the National Adult Reading Tes
was not the participant’s mother tongue.
bQuestionnaire data (OCI-R, STAI) from 1 participant with OCD were los
Biological Psychiatry: Cognitive Neuroscience and Neurabout the effectiveness of their actions. Therefore, accurate
action-outcome contingencies detection but imprecise
behavioral adjustment to instrumental contingency would
support a dissociation between an accurate cognitive
appraisal of the environment and a failure to use this knowl-
edge to guide behavior.
However, patients with OCD generally recognize their
behavior as irrational and hence exhibit a dichotomy between
their behavior and their beliefs about the effectiveness of their
actions. Therefore, accurate action-outcome contingency
detection but imprecise behavioral adjustment to instrumental
contingency would support a dissociation between an accu-
rate cognitive appraisal of the environment and a failure to use
this knowledge to guide behavior. The ego-dystonic nature of
OCD, whereby the urge to perform an action is associated with
the knowledge that the action is excessive or irrelevant, would
resonate with the latter scenario. In this study, we show this
prediction to be valid.
METHODS AND MATERIALS
Participants
The study included 27 patients and 27 healthy control subjects
matched for relevant demographic variables (Table 1). Patients
met criteria for OCD diagnosis with no current comorbidity.
Patients were not enrolled if they scored less than 12 on the
Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale (29) and if they re-
ported hoarding symptoms, as hoarding may represent a
separate clinical entity (30). Nineteen patients were receiving
medication for OCD (Supplement).
Procedure
Contingency Degradation. We used contingency degra-
dation experimental manipulation to study action-outcome
contingencies detection. The standard contingency measure
(1), DP, indexed the action-outcome relationship. DP was the
difference between 1) the conditional probability of receiving
an outcome following an action—that is, the probability ofSample
CD Group (n = 27) Statistic p
14/13 c21 = 0.074 .785
39.52 6 10.65 t52 = 0.383 .704
116.33 6 3.45 t51 = 1.697 .096
9.70 6 4.65 t52 = 28.833 , .001
42.86 6 9.97 t51 = 26.751 , .001
56.15 6 7.96 t51 = 210.940 , .001
30.50 6 12.33 t51 = 29.305 , .001
22.52 6 4.94
10.81 6 2.69
11.70 6 2.43
OCD, obsessive-compulsive disorder; OCI-R, Obsessive-Compulsive
n Obsessive Compulsive Scale.
t; data from 1 participant with OCD were not included because English
t owing to technical error.
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response-contingent outcome; and 2) the probability of
receiving an outcome in the absence of that action—that is,
the probability of outcome given the absence of an action
[P(OjwA)], i.e., the probability of a noncontingent outcome,
such that DP = P(OjA) 2 P(OjwA) (31). Measures of interest
include the overall relationship between contingency and
behavior and between contingency and perceived contin-
gency. By increasing noncontingent outcomes, the contin-
gency (i.e., the causal action-outcome association) is
degraded, hence reduced, or becomes negative (Figure 1A–C).
If guided by the goal-directed system, an agent should stop
responding on contingency degradation.
Novel Protocol to Test Sensitivity to Action-Outcome
Contingency. We developed a novel free-operant, self-
paced procedure (Supplement). A white triangle permanently
on the screen signaled that the participant was free to press or
not press the space bar. When a reward was delivered,
following a key press or not, a yellow triangle with a 25p image
was shown at the end of the bin for 500 ms with the text
“Reward, you win!” and a tone (Figure 2A). On each response,
the triangle turned yellow until the end of the a priori speciﬁed
bin to signal that a response has been recorded and to prevent
multiple responses within the same 1-second bin. If no
outcome was delivered, no feedback was given, and the next
bin started. A running total of pence accumulated within the
block was displayed in the top right corner of the screen. There
were 12 blocks, not explicitly labeled as such to the partici-
pants. At the beginning of each block, the running total of
pence was reset to 0. Causality judgments on the relationship
between pressing the key and receiving the reward were
collected at the end of each block (Figure 2A). The ﬁrst 3
blocks (blocks 1–3) were always presented in the same order
(high contingency, degradation, extinction), providing an im-
plicit training phase. The remaining blocks (i.e., blocks 4–12)
were presented according to a Latin square design across
participants (Table 2). Each block lasted for 2 minutes (120
unsignaled bins) (Supplement). If a response occurred during a
given bin, the outcome was delivered with probability P(OjA)
deﬁned a priori for that block; if no response occurred, the
outcome was delivered with probability P(OjwA) deﬁned a
priori for that block (Figure 2B). Only the ﬁrst space-bar press
within the bin had any programmed consequences. The totaloutcome is delivered on performance of an action with a given probability [P(OjA)]
an action with a given probability [P(OjwA)]. If the contingency is degraded to the
nil, and the probability of the reinforcer is the same regardless of any response. (
and the action reduces the probability of reinforcer delivery. P(OjA), probability of
of an action; violet ﬁlled circles, contingent outcomes; green empty circles, nonc
202 Biological Psychiatry: Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuroimaging Fnumber of responses within each bin was also recorded, but
responding beyond the ﬁrst response of the bin had no pro-
grammed consequences. We varied P(OjA) and P(OjwA) giv-
ing blocks with different contingency levels and obtaining
different experimental conditions (Figure 2B, C and Table 2).
We did not include a cost for responding, in line with experi-
mental studies in rodents where there is no explicit punishment
for responding (see Supplementary Pilot Experiments and
Supplemental Figure S3 for results from pilot experiments with
and without such costs).
Experienced Contingency. As expected based on our
task’s implementation, there was a high correlation between
the mean experienced contingency (based on experienced
event frequencies) and the contingencies programmed a priori
for control subjects (r = .999, p , .001) and patients (r = .998,
p , .001) alike (Table 2 and Supplement). Therefore, pro-
grammed contingencies were used for subsequent analysis.
Our ﬁndings were not confounded by between-group differ-
ences in experienced contingencies, as no main effect of
group (F1,48.49 = 0.01, p = .940) or interaction between group
and block (F11,559.95 = 1.06, p = .395) on experienced contin-
gency was found.
Data Analysis
All statistical tests were two-sided, and parametric or
nonparametric tests were applied according to assumptions of
the speciﬁc statistical test. We analyzed response rate and
causality judgments using a two-step approach. First, we
identiﬁed if there was a between-group difference in sensitivity
to instrumental contingency. To this end, we computed a
response rate by dividing the number of responses by the
number of bins for each block. For each dependent variable
(response rate and causality judgment), programmed contin-
gency was used as a within-subject factor, and group was
used as a between-subject factor. All data were collapsed
across blocks having equal contingencies. Analyses were
performed in R version 3.3.1 (R Foundation for Statistical
Computing, Vienna, Austria; http://www.r-project.org/) using
the ez package for analysis of variance. Levene’s test was
used to verify homogeneity of variance. Mauchly’s test of
sphericity was applied, and Greenhouse-Geisser and Huynh-
Feldt corrections were used for substantial (ε , 0.75) and
minimal (ε $ 0.75) violation, respectively. To investigate theFigure 1. Contingency manipulation. To degrade
the contingency, once agents have learned to
perform an action to receive a reward with a certain
probability, a schedule of noncontingent outcome
delivery is superimposed. By increasing the fre-
quency of noncontingent outcomes, the overall
contingency (i.e., the causal association between an
action and its consequences) is degraded or be-
comes negative. If guided by the goal-directed sys-
tem, an agent should stop responding in the face of
contingency degradation. (A) Diagram illustrating a
schedule with a positive contingency, in which
. (B) Contingency is degraded by also delivering outcomes in the absence of
extent that the two probabilities are equal, the causal status of the action is
C) When P(OjwA) is higher than P(OjA), the contingency becomes negative,
outcome given an action; P(OjwA) probability of outcome given the absence
ontingent outcomes.
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Figure 2. Experimental paradigm. (A) Subjects
had to complete an experimental session of 12
blocks of 2 minutes each. At the end of each block,
subjects had to judge to what extent pressing the
space bar caused the occurrence of the reward, on a
scale from 2100 (pressing the space bar always
prevented reward) to 100 (pressing the space bar
always caused reward). During the experimental
session, the participant was presented with a white
triangle and could decide whether to press the space
bar or not. Rewards were delivered contingently on
pressing of the space bar or noncontingently in the
absence of a response. In addition, a running total of
the amount of money earned within a block was
continuously displayed in the upper corner of the
screen (not shown in ﬁgure). In cases where the
participant was not pressing the space bar for mul-
tiple (hidden) 1-second bins in a row, the white tri-
angle was continuously displayed on the screen,
unless a nonresponse contingent reward occurred.
In those cases, a reward was displayed on the
screen noncontingently. (B) Each block was divided
into 120 unsignaled time periods (bins) of 1 second.
When a response occurred within each bin, the tri-
angle turned yellow until the bin ended. If a response was recorded during the bin, a contingent reward was delivered at the end of that bin according to the
applicable probability of outcome delivery given a response [P(OjA)]. If no response occurred during the bin, a noncontingent reward was delivered according
to the applicable probability of outcome delivery given the absence of a response [P(OjwA)]. (C) By varying P(OjA) and P(OjwA), different levels of contin-
gencies were achieved so that each experimental session included positive, degraded, and negative contingency blocks. O, outcome; P(OjA), probability of
outcome given an action; P(OjwA), probability of outcome given the absence of an action.
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rate between groups, we used linear mixed-effects models.
Group was used as a ﬁxed-effect factor; linear (and, where
applicable, quadratic) causality judgments were used as
continuous ﬁxed-effect predictors. The maximal random-effect
structure justiﬁed by the design was speciﬁed (32) using mixed
models (33).
Second, for conditions in which we observed diminished
sensitivity to instrumental contingency in patients, weTable 2. Response Rates and Causality Judgments
Block
Programmed Contingency
Experie
Conting
P(OjA) P(OjwA) DP CTL
Fixed Order 1 0.60 0.00 0.60 0.59
2 0.60 0.60 0.00 0.01
3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Shufﬂed in Latin Square
Design
4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 0.00 0.30 20.30 20.29
6 0.00 0.60 20.60 20.62
7 0.30 0.00 0.30 0.30
8 0.30 0.30 0.00 0.03
9 0.30 0.60 20.30 20.28
10 0.60 0.00 0.60 0.60
11 0.60 0.30 0.30 0.32
12 0.60 0.60 0.00 20.01
Dependent variables are given as mean (SD). Blocks 1–3 were presented i
design. Lines in the table refer to different conditions depending on the dens
0.0; block 7, block 8, and block 9 had P(OjA) = 0.3; block 10, block 11, and b
experimentally programmed contingency resulting from the a priori program
CTL, control; OCD, obsessive-compulsive disorder; P(OjA), probability o
absence of an action; DP, contingency.
Biological Psychiatry: Cognitive Neuroscience and Neurtested whether such behavior was due to imbalances in the
goal-directed and habit systems. Accordingly, we obtained
a ratio score by considering pairs of contingent and cor-
responding degraded blocks in which P(OjA) was stable
and P(OjwA) was increased (18). Therefore, we also
focused on speciﬁc contingency transitions in which
P(OjwA) increases without changes to P(OjA): this manip-
ulation degrades instrumental contingency without affecting
the contiguity of actions and outcomes that drives S-Rnced
ency Response Rate Causality Judgment
OCD CTL OCD CTL OCD
0.60 0.51 (0.21) 0.49 (0.24) 43.30 (34.27) 48.60 (31.82)
0.05 0.26 (0.20) 0.35 (0.27) 8.17 (27.64) 10.67 (44.74)
0.00 0.37 (0.27) 0.48 (0.27) 210.46 (39.75) 214.81 (45.60)
0.00 0.38 (0.23) 0.48 (0.27) 215.17 (36.06) 221.35 (40.43)
20.30 0.26 (0.21) 0.27 (0.21) 250.43 (47.60) 241.51 (55.30)
20.60 0.20 (0.23) 0.21 (0.16) 255.27 (44.83) 232.53 (66.08)
0.30 0.49 (0.22) 0.62 (0.20) 27.54 (24.20) 35.34 (25.33)
0.00 0.34 (0.26) 0.41 (0.24) 0.01 (31.53) 0.36 (37.34)
20.29 0.29 (0.26) 0.32 (0.26) 212.95 (47.98) 29.40 (38.56)
0.60 0.62 (0.21) 0.56 (0.23) 56.01 (26.67) 53.52 (30.84)
0.31 0.38 (0.26) 0.53 (0.25) 22.49 (30.71) 33.06 (32.79)
0.00 0.29 (0.23) 0.38 (0.25) 9.64 (31.81) 8.30 (36.75)
n a ﬁxed order; blocks 4–12 were presented according to a Latin square
ity of contingent outcomes. Block 4, block 5, and block 6 had P(OjA) =
lock 12 had P(OjA) = 0.6. Programmed contingency refers to the a priori
med conditional probabilities.
f outcome given an action; P(OjwA), probability of outcome given the
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responding. For each pair, the number of responses in the
contingent block was divided by the sum of responses in
both the contingent and the degraded blocks. Thus, the
ratio score represents the number of responses in the
contingent condition as a proportion of the total responses
made across both contingent and degraded conditions.
Values close to 1 indicate high sensitivity to contingency,
and values close to 0.5 indicate habitual behavior indexing
equal responding in both contingent and correspondingly
degraded conditions.
RESULTS
Effect of Instrumental Contingency on Response
Rate
Mean response rate increased with contingency (F4,208 =
65.028, p , .001) (Figure 3A). Overall, there were no
between-group differences in response rate (F1,52 = 1.074,
p = .305), ruling out apathy or generalized impulsivity in pa-
tients. Between-group responding was differentially affected
by the contingency (group 3 contingency: F4,208 = 3.922, p =
.01); this difference was explored via between-group simple-
effect comparisons at each contingency level. Patients per-
sisted in responding more than control subjects with low
instrumental contingency (DP = 0.3, F1,52 = 6.036, p = .017).
Such responding did not correlate with impulsivity, as
measured by the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (r = .312, p =
.129) (34). Patients also responded marginally more at
DP = 0.0, but this did not reach signiﬁcance (F1,52 = 3.185,
p = .080). Results were not affected by medication status orFigure 3. Mean response rate and causality judgments for control (CTL) group
contingency (DP). Both groups responded more for higher contingencies. Howe
gency. (B) Subjective judgments of causality increased as a direct function of resp
order of programmed contingency, but contingencies were experienced by eac
niﬁcant difference to facilitate post hoc comparisons (error bars are6 0.5 least sig
this error bar can be used only for within-subject comparisons. The difference be
not signiﬁcant. However, CTL subjects, but not patients with OCD, subjectively
contingency between DP = 20.3 and DP = 20.6). (C) Response rate as a function
action-outcome knowledge to guide their behavior. Points and error bars (SEMs) s
text, data were collapsed across blocks having equal contingencies (DP =20.6, b
8, block 12; DP = 0.3, block 7, block 11; DP = 0.6, block 1, block 10. See Table
experimentally programmed contingency resulting from the a priori programme
interaction; #p , .05, group 3 quadratic causality judgment interaction. n.s., not
204 Biological Psychiatry: Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuroimaging Fby reward responsiveness (Supplement and Supplemental
Figure S1).
Additional responding within each 1-second time bin (su-
perﬂuous responses beyond the ﬁrst, i.e., with no behavioral
effect) was not affected by instrumental contingency (contin-
gency: F4,208 = 0.621, p = .648) or group (group: F1,52 = 0.017,
p = .896; group 3 contingency: F4,208 = 0.070, p = .991). Dif-
ferences in the additional number of responses within each bin
would have been consistent with a framework in which
excessive responding in OCD is attributed to inhibition failure.
Our ﬁndings instead reinforced the notion that patients
expressed habitual responding, a hypothesis we test directly
below.
Effect of Instrumental Contingency on Causality
Judgments
Causality ratings were a direct function of action-outcome
contingency (F4,208 = 74.099, p , .001) (Figure 3B). There
were no between-group differences in causality judgments
(group: F1,52 = 2.379, p = .129; group 3 contingency: F4,208 =
1.084, p = .366). Medication status did not affect the results
(Supplement and Supplemental Figure S1).
Relationship Between Response Rate and Causality
Judgments
Patients and control subjects differed in the way causality
judgments predicted response rate, in a nonlinear fashion.
Overall, response rate was linearly predicted by causality rat-
ings (F1,45.449 = 58.154, p , .001), with no between-group
difference (group 3 causalitylinear: F1,45.449 = 1.489, p = .229).and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) group. (A) Mean response rate by
ver, patients with OCD showed reduced sensitivity to instrumental contin-
onse-outcome contingency in both groups. Data are presented in ascending
h subject in a semirandomized order. Error bar indicates Fisher’s least sig-
niﬁcant difference). However, in the context of mixed designs, as in this case,
tween OCD and CTL groups in mean causality judgments at DP = 20.6 was
detected a difference between neighboring levels of negative programmed
of causality judgment by group. The two populations differentially employed
how values clustered by programmed contingency. As described in the main
lock 6; DP =20.3, block 5, block 9; DP = 0.0, block 2, block 3, block 4, block
2 for naming of the blocks). Programmed contingency refers to the a priori
d conditional probabilities. *p , .05, within-group comparison; ##p , .01,
signiﬁcant.
ebruary 2019; 4:200–209 www.sobp.org/BPCNNI
Table 3. Subjective Accounts When the Contingency Was Zero
Subjective Accounts of Behavior Adopted (Multiple Choice)
Other
Mostly Did
Not Press
Sometimes
Pressed
Kept
Pressing
CTLa 2 17 7 1 c2 = 17.839,
p , .001OCDa 4 3 5 10
Subjective Accounts of Behavior Adopted (Summary of Spontaneous Descriptions)
CTL OCDb CTL OCDc CTL OCDd CTL OCDe CTLf OCDf
No point/no difference (Pressing or not
did not make any difference)
1 — 14 2 2 3 — 1 63% 27%
Checking (To check whether occurrence
of reward changed)
1 2 1 — 2 — — 1 15% 14%
Habit (Can’t stop/In the habit of pressing) — — — — — — — 2 0% 9%
Just in case (Just in case reward stopped
when not pressing the bar)
— — — 1 — 1 — 1 0% 14%
Mind wandering (Kept pressing because
mind wandering)
— — — — — — — 1 0% 4%
Otherg — 2 2 — 3 1 1 4 22% 32%
CTL, control; OCD, obsessive-compulsive disorder.
aAbsence of contingency identiﬁed CTL participants (27/27) and OCD participants (22/22). Data were not available for 5 participants with OCD.
Control participants and participants with OCD recognized the absence of contingency in relevant blocks and that key pressing did not make a
difference. The majority of control participants did not press the key. In contrast, more participants with OCD continued to press the key.
Subjective accounts for behavior adopted also differed, with the majority of control participants giving as a reason that pressing or not pressing
made no difference to the occurrence of the outcome. In contrast, a minority of participants with OCD gave this subjective account; the majority
justiﬁed their behavior instead as checking, habit, or “just in case” conduct.
b–eEach pair refers to the spontaneous description of the corresponding multiple choice category (bOther; cMostly Did not Press; dSometimes
Pressed; eKept Pressing).
fPercentage corresponds to the proportion of people within each group to give a speciﬁc subjective account of behavior. Percentage was
calculated based on the number of people within each group correctly identifying an absence of contingency (CTL, n = 27; OCD, n = 22).
gSeven participants with OCD gave subjective accounts that were classiﬁed as “Other” (2, “Don’t know”; 1, “I pressed the space bar because it
was less boring”; 1, “Pressing was entertaining and did not cause any loss”; 1, “I pressed sometimes according to the feeling of what it was better”;
1, “I pressed because the money was occasionally coming”; 1, “I pressed the space bar sometimes pressed because otherwise nothing was
happening”).
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differed between groups (group 3 causalityquadratic: F1,204.827 =
3.959, p = .0479) (Figure 3C). Although model ﬁtting residuals
indicated larger residual variance in the OCD group (F323,323 =
1.28, p = .013), this has no obvious implications for altering the
interpretation (35).
This analysis thus indicated an altered, nonlinear relationship
between causality judgments and response rate in patients and
represents a formal demonstration of the differential use of
action-outcome knowledge to modulate behavior in patients,
also supported by patients’ reports (Table 3). Thus, in patients,
for positive contingencies, behavior persisted for low instru-
mental contingencies despite intact and accurately reported
action-outcome knowledge of the causal effect of their actions.
For negative contingencies, the equivalent response rates be-
tween control subjects and patients (Figure 3A) interacted with
a tendency for patients to believe their actions to be less
detrimental than control subjects (programmed DP = 20.3 and
DP = 20.6) (Figure 3B). Therefore, patients did not recognize
their action to have very negative consequences. However,
they behaved the same way as control subjects, whose ratings
correctly identiﬁed a highly negative action-outcome contin-
gency. We analyzed response rate for different time windows of
each block, thus excluding the possibility that such dissociation
was due to different learning processes in patients (Supplement
and Supplemental Figure S2).Biological Psychiatry: Cognitive Neuroscience and NeurHabit or Goal-Directed Ratio Score
We computed a ratio score controlling for response variability
across subjects and to test precisely if increased responding
observed for DP = 0.3 (Figure 3A) was due to habitual behavior.
We focused on contingency degradation occurring after the
implicit training phase and computed the ratio score for pairs
of blocks for which the action-outcome relationship was
contingent (DP = 0.6 [P(OjA) = 0.6, P(OjwA) = 0.0], block 10)
and then degraded to DP = 0.3 by superimposing a noncon-
tingent schedule (DP = 0.3 [P(OjA) = 0.6, P(OjwA) = 0.3], block
11). Whereas control subjects showed a robust decline in
responding on contingency degradation, as indicated by a
ratio score well above 0.5 (one-sample t test tested against
0.5, t26 = 5.918, p , .001), patients responded nearly equally in
both conditions, with their ratio score being close to 0.5
(one-sample t test against 0.5, t26 = 0.585, p = .563). There was
a between-group difference in the ratio score (t52 = 3.350, p =
.002) (Figure 4A). Furthermore, subjects were classiﬁed
dichotomously as goal-directed (ratio score .0.5) or habitual
(ratio score#0.5), with higher proportion of habitual subjects in
the OCD group (control group, habitual 2/27; OCD group,
habitual 12/27; c21 = 7.811, p = .005). There was no correlation
between the ratio score and symptom severity (Yale-Brown
Obsessive Compulsive Scale) in patients (r = 2.101, p = .625).
Similarly, we observed a marginal effect for increased
responding at DP = 0.0 (Figure 3A). Therefore, we calculated aoimaging February 2019; 4:200–209 www.sobp.org/BPCNNI 205
Figure 4. Habit and goal-directed ratio scores for contingent and corresponding degraded-contingency conditions. The ratio score was computed by
dividing the number of responses in the nondegraded block by the sum of the responses for the degraded and nondegraded sessions [i.e., (contingent/
(contingent1degraded)]. The ratio score represents the proportion of responses in the contingent condition relative to the nondegraded condition, with a value
#0.5 indicating a greater or equal number of responses in the degraded contingency (DP) condition and thus habitual behavior. (A) Ratio score for pairs of
blocks for which the action-outcome relationship was contingent (DP = 0.6 [P(OjA) = 0.6, P(OjwA) = 0.0], block 10) and then degraded to DP = 0.3 by
superimposing a noncontingent schedule (DP = 0.3 [P(OjA) = 0.6, P(OjwA) = 0.3], block 11). Patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) displayed
increased habitual behavior (t52 = 3.350, p = .002). (B) Ratio score for pairs of blocks for which the action-outcome relationship was contingent (DP = 0.6
[P(OjA) = 0.6, P(OjwA) = 0.0], block 10) and then completely degraded to DP = 0.0 by superimposing a noncontingent schedule (DP = 0.0 [P(OjA) = 0.6,
P(OjwA) = 0.6], block 12). Patients with OCD showed increased habitual behavior compared with control (CTL) subjects (t52 = 2.23, p = .03). (C) Ratio score for
pairs of blocks for which the action-outcome relationship was contingent (DP = 0.3 [P(OjA) = 0.3, P(OjwA) = 0.0], block 7) and then completely degraded to
DP = 0.0 by superimposing a noncontingent schedule (DP = 0.0 [P(OjA) = 0.3, P(OjwA) = 0.3], block 8). Error bars: SEM. *p , .05; **p , .01. P(OjA), probability
of outcome given an action; P(OjwA), probability of outcome given the absence of an action.
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ship was contingent (DP = 0.6 [P(OjA) = 0.6, P(OjwA) = 0.0],
block 10) and then completely degraded to DP = 0.0 by
superimposing a noncontingent schedule (DP = 0.0 [P(OjA) =
0.6, P(OjwA) = 0.6], block 12). Even though both control
subjects and patients with OCD showed a response rate
signiﬁcantly different from 0.5 (one-sample t test against 0.5;
control subjects: t26 = 7.334, p , .001; patients with OCD:
t26 = 3.388, p = .002), patients showed diminished goal-
directed behavior compared with control subjects (ratio
score: t52 = 2.23, p = .03) (Figure 4B). There was no between-
group difference when action-outcome relationship was
completely degraded from low instrumental contingency (i.e.,
DP = 0.3 [P(OjA) = 0.3, P(OjwA) = 0.0], block 7, and DP = 0.0
[P(OjA) = 0.3, P(OjwA) = 0.3], block 8) (Figure 4C). The
absence of this effect might be due to impaired detection of
diminished instrumental contingency in patients. Patients were
already showing increased responding for low instrumental
contingencies compared with control subjects (DP = 0.3
[P(OjA) = 0.3, P(OjwA) = 0.0], block 7: F1,52 = 4.961, p = .030)
for which contingency degradation was therefore perhaps
ineffective owing to a ceiling effect.
We did not detect an effect of repetition on habit develop-
ment (Supplement) (36). Across groups, habitual behavior early
in training was associated with higher OCD traits measured
by the Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory–Revised (r = 2.280,
p = .046).
Absence of Depressive Realism in OCD
Previous data have shown that healthy subjects have biased
higher causality judgment estimates when the contingency is
zero (37). This erroneous estimation arises when contingent206 Biological Psychiatry: Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuroimaging Fand noncontingent outcomes occur frequently (i.e., high den-
sity of reinforcement), but not when they occur infrequently
(i.e., low density of reinforcement). In contrast, depressed in-
dividuals show a depressive realism whereby, regardless of the
density of reinforcement, they correctly report having no
causal effect on outcome occurrence (37). Because patients
showed higher depression scores compared with control
subjects, we tested between-group differences in causality
judgments for DP = 0.0 blocks with different reinforcement
densities (blocks 4, 8, and 12) (Table 2). Selection was limited
to the Latin square phase to have an equal number of obser-
vations for each condition. Estimation of causal control was
higher for higher reinforcement density (F2,104 = 8.365, p ,
.001) (Figure 5A), with no between-group differences (group:
F1,52 = 0.171, p = .681; group 3 reward density; F2,104 = 0.124,
p = .883), despite higher depressive symptoms in patients.DISCUSSION
Patients with OCD showed dissociations between their exhibi-
ted response rates and their causal judgments about the
effectiveness in controlling outcomes. This was manifested in
distinct ways for positive and negative contingencies. For pos-
itive contingencies, OCD patients exhibited increased response
rates when outcomes were less contingent on responding. This
lack of inﬂuence of instrumental contingency over behavior is
consistent with the overresponding resulting from enhanced
S-R habitual tendencies and diminished sensitivity to instru-
mental contingency. In contrast, explicit action-outcome
knowledge was intact: patients gave accurate subjective as-
sessments of the cause-effect relationship between actions and
their consequences, which did not differ from those of controlebruary 2019; 4:200–209 www.sobp.org/BPCNNI
Figure 5. Causality judgments when the contingency (DP) was zero.
There were no group differences. For both the control (CTL) group and
obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) group, causality judgments increased
as a function of higher density of reinforcement even though there was no
causal association between the action and the outcome (contingency DP =
0.0) in all three situations. Error bar indicates Fisher’s least signiﬁcant dif-
ference to facilitate post hoc comparisons (error bars are 6 0.5 least sig-
niﬁcant difference). However, in the context of mixed designs, as in this
case, this error bar can be used only for within-subject comparisons. ***p #
.001, main effect of density of outcome. P(OjA), probability of outcome given
an action; P(OjwA), probability of outcome given the absence of an action.
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environmental contingencies to guide their actions in a manner
that differed from control subjects. Hence, in patients with OCD,
for positive contingencies, excessive responding was dissoci-
ated from intact explicit action-outcome knowledge. For nega-
tive contingencies, the interaction was reversed between
response rate and subjective judgment. Here, response rates
were equivalent between the two groups, despite patients with
OCD judging their actions to be somewhat less detrimental.
In previous neuroimaging studies of contingency knowledge
in healthy volunteers, functional activity of the inferior and su-
perior parietal lobule and the middle frontal gyrus was shown to
scalewith subjective reports of instrumental contingency (19). In
OCD, parietal abnormalities (38) together with diminished
caudate-parietal connectivity (39,40) might contribute to the
inefﬁcient use of explicit knowledge of instrumental contin-
gencies to guide behavior. The inability to modulate behavior
according to action-outcome contingencies in patients might
be due not only to abnormal striatal encoding of action-outcome
contingencies but also (or alternatively) to an inability of action-
outcome metacognitive knowledge (putatively dependent onBiological Psychiatry: Cognitive Neuroscience and Neurparietal activity) to guide responding. In this respect, future
empirical testing using functional magnetic resonance imaging
would clarify whether a lack of integration between the fronto-
parietal system and the caudate contributes to the ego-
dystonic, compulsive nature of OCD.
Accurate subjective judgments, especially for positive
contingencies, indicated intact action-outcome knowledge not
only in control subjects, as previously shown (14,19–21), but
also in patients with OCD. For negative contingencies only,
there were subjective judgment inaccuracies in patients, as
actions were reported as less detrimental than experienced.
Although these ﬁndings with negative contingencies should be
interpreted with caution in the context of a lack of a main group
effect, they suggest that patients with OCD might perceive
their actions to have less disadvantageous consequences than
experienced. Overall, when noncontingent outcomes were
more likely than contingent ones, increased response rates
and inaccurate contingency ratings were observed. Even
though it remains to be clariﬁed why noncontingent outcomes
had a differential effect on behavior and causality judgments,
patients had particular difﬁculties in integrating noncontingent
conditional probabilities. Such an effect might depend on a
circuit including the posterior caudate and the inferior frontal
gyrus, which has been shown to selectively decode noncon-
tingent conditional probabilities (19).
More generally, cognitive theories of OCD (7,41) point to an
exaggerated appraisal of intrusive thoughts, which is believed to
be critical in the maintenance of the disorder. In this respect,
OCD is conceptualized in terms of the impact of inﬂated evalu-
ation of intrusive thoughts on action. In direct contrast, in the
present study patients with OCD showed intact action-outcome
contingency knowledge, especially for positive contingencies;
however, despite this correct contingency appraisal, they
exhibited exaggerated responding. Therefore, rather than sup-
porting a model whereby OCD is maintained by exaggerated and
dysfunctional appraisal of action contingencies, the ﬁndings
suggest that exaggerated actions, possibly rooted in a pro-
pensity toward habits (42), lie at the core of the disorder.
Patients exhibited excessive responding when the action-
outcome contingency was degraded, the effect being pre-
sent when contingency was partially and completely degraded.
Excessive responding emerged both from insensitivity to free
rewards, presumably owing to habitual responding (Figure 4),
and from decreased sensitivity to low instrumental contin-
gencies (Figure 3), presumably deriving from a deﬁcient goal-
directed system. Our ﬁndings resonate with previous studies
that used outcome devaluation in appetitive (9) and aversive
domains (11). We extended those ﬁndings by testing habits via
contingency degradation (1). Correct action-outcome contin-
gency appraisal agrees with previous data showing intact
awareness of explicit associative contingencies in the case of
outcome devaluation in OCD (11), although in a context of
multiple action-outcome associations, patients with OCD
show weaker knowledge of action-outcome causal relation-
ships (9). Neurocomputational models have also suggested
imbalances between the goal-directed and the habitual sys-
tems in OCD (25).
Translational work using contingency degradation in rats
(13,16,17), marmoset monkeys (18), and humans (14,19,21) has
identiﬁed corticostriatal determinants of goal-directed andoimaging February 2019; 4:200–209 www.sobp.org/BPCNNI 207
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dorsomedial striatum (the putative homologue of the human
caudate nucleus) prevented action-outcome association
encoding during instrumental conditioning (43). In marmosets,
insensitivity to contingency degradation was detected following
perigenual anterior cingulate and orbitofrontal cortex lesions (18).
In humans, activity in the medial prefrontal cortex/medial orbital
cortex and the anterior caudate was associated with contingency
learning and goal-directed behavior (19,21,44). In healthy volun-
teers, reduced gray matter volume in the caudate correlated with
a propensity toward habits (25). In OCD, a hyperactive caudate
nucleus was also related to excessive habit formation, tested in
avoidance with outcome devaluation (10). Therefore, lack of
behavioral suppression on contingency degradation plausibly
depends on abnormalities in circuits also implicated in OCD
pathophysiology (23). Animal work has also shown differential
sensitivity to outcome devaluation and contingency degradation
(45). Such a distinction can be now tested in humans by using
the paradigm devised here as well as those using outcome
devaluation.
Previous studies have shown that affective states inﬂuence
the way contingencies are perceived (37). When there is a lack
of action-outcome contingency and noncontingent reward
occurs frequently, causal control overestimation is observed in
nondepressed people. Depressed individuals show instead an
accurate detection of the lack of contingency (i.e., depressive
realism). In this study, when the contingency was zero, cau-
sality judgments increased as a function of the reward density,
equally in control subjects and patients. Even though patients
were relatively more depressed than control subjects, their
emotional/affective state did not inﬂuence their contingencies’
perception in a way that was signiﬁcantly different from that of
control subjects.
Classical theories predict habit development owing to
repetition over time (36), but we did not observe a shift from
goal-directed to habitual behavior over early and late experi-
mental phases. This might be due to the experimental design,
which did not lend itself to optimal investigation of this pos-
sibility. At the beginning, participants experienced the ﬁrst
three blocks in the same order, but then blocks were presented
in a semirandomized design. This manipulation might
conceivably have diluted the effect of repetition owing to the
different number of instrumental contingencies experienced
before the relevant critical test across subjects. Furthermore,
the short task duration may have limited the possibility of
detecting training effects, in line with evidence that limited
overtraining in instrumental behaviors often fails to produce
habit learning (46).
OCD is known to be linked to serotonergic abnormalities,
and there is evidence in healthy humans that diminished
serotonin promotes habitual behavior (47). The effect we
observed was not apparently due to patients’ medication
status; such medication is designed to increase serotonergic
transmission. This conclusion, however, has limited statis-
tical power owing to the small sample size.
In conclusion, this study shows a mismatch between explicit
action-outcome knowledge and behavior, possibly reﬂecting
the ego-dystonic nature of OCD. It reinforces the hypothesis
that a deﬁcient goal-directed system is a contributor to OCD,208 Biological Psychiatry: Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuroimaging Fusing the criterion of contingency degradation and employing a
novel, translationally valid behavioral paradigm.
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